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Sherman remarked:
[E]ither a foreigner or a native may escape 'the
criminal part of the law' by staying out of our
jurisdiction .... but if they have property here it is
subject to civil process .... [A foreigner] may
combine or conspire to his heart's content if none
of his co-conspirators are here or his property is
not here. 21 CONG. REc. 2461, reprintedin Earl W.
Kinter, ed., THE LEGISLATVE HisTORy OF FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES, Part I, THE

ANTrTRUST LAWS at 126 (1978).

Accordingly, the legislative history further justified
the court's refusal to apply the criminal provisions of the
Sherman Act to Jujo's conduct.
In summary, despite finding sufficient contacts to
establish personal jurisdiction over Nippon, the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted Nippon's motion to dismiss. The court explained
that the Government's criminal indictment failed to
present evidence of a vertical price fixing agreement
between Jujo and the Japanese trading companies.
Furthermore, the court held that the Sherman Act did not
permit it to rule on alleged activities occurring solely
outside of the United States.

NFL's fixed wage plan exempt from antitrust laws
by PaulLukitsch
In certain circumstances, labor
unions and multi-employer groups
may negotiate free from the restric-

tions embodied in the federal
antitrust laws. In Brown v. Pro
FootballInc., 116 S. Ct. 2116
(1996), the United States Supreme
Court held that the National Football
League ("NFL"), a group of football
clubs, is immune from a player's
association antitrust class action.
The class action was brought after
an impasse in negotiations; the
football clubs, bargaining together,
implemented a unilateral wage plan.
In reaching its decision, the Court
ruled that a "nonstatutory" antitrust
exemption implicit in the federal
labor laws applies. The Court stated
that this exemption, which is aimed
at encouraging the collective
bargaining process, shielded the
employers from the antitrust laws
and allowed the implementation of a
unilateral wage plan.
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In 1987, a collective bargaining
agreement between the NFL and the
NFL Players Association ("Association"), a labor union, expired.
During negotiations over a new
contract, the NFL adopted a plan
which would permit each club to
establish a "developmental squad"
of up to six "first-year" or rookie
players. The developmental squad
would include players who had
failed to secure a position on a
regular player roster, and under the
plan, the developmental squad
would play in practice games and
occasionally in regular games as
substitutes for injured players. The
plan provided for these squad
members to receive the same weekly
salary as regular contracted players.
In April of 1989, the NFL
presented this plan to the Association and proposed that the squad
members should receive $1,000 per
week. The Association disagreed,

insisting that the developmental
squad players should receive the
same benefits from club owners as
those provided to regular players,
including allowing squad members
to negotiate individually with club
owners regarding their respective
salaries. After two months of
negotiations, the two groups reached
an impasse. The NFL unilaterally
implemented its last good faith offer
at the proposed $1,000 weekly
salary and distributed uniform
contracts to the club owners. The
NFL then advised the club owners of
resulting disciplinary actions to
those owners who did not follow the
weekly salary provisions.
As a result of the NFL's unilateral
implementation, 235 developmental
squad members subsequently
brought this class action suit against
the NFL and its member clubs. The
Association claimed that the NFL's
and the club owners' agreement to
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pay a $1,000 per week salary
violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1996), which forbids agreements in restraint of trade. A federal
district court found in favor of the
Association, and a jury awarded it
$30 million in damages. On appeal,
the Appellate Court for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed,
holding that a nonstatutory antitrust
exemption barred the Association's
claims. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and Justice Breyer
delivered the 8-1 majority opinion,
holding that the NFL's unilateral
implementation of the fixed wage
plan after a bargaining impasse is
exempt from the antitrust laws.

Existence and scope of the
implicit "nonstatutory"
antitrust exemption
In rejecting the Association's
antitrust claims, the Court relied on
earlier Supreme Court precedent
which states that an implicit
"nonstatutory" exemption from the
application of the antitrust laws
exists in certain circumstances.
Previously, the Court ruled that the
public policy considerations implicit
in federal labor laws under 29
U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. aim to promote
free and private collective bargaining, requiring good faith negotiation
over wages, hours, and working
conditions. According to the Court,
an exemption is implicit in this
policy--Congress did not consider
the judicial use of the antitrust laws
as appropriate for labor disputes, but
rather viewed conflicts under the
labor statutes as administrative
resolutions appropriately left to the
National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB"). In effect, the implied
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exemption takes labor-related
disputes out of the hands of the
antitrust courts.
Further, the Court found that for
meaningful collective bargaining to
take place, an exemption to the
antitrust laws is necessary to give
effect to the federal labor statutes
and to promote the peaceful settlement of labor disputes through
mediation and negotiation. For
example, the Court noted that
allowing the antitrust laws to
interfere with collective bargaining
does not allow employers to safely
discuss pre-impasse offers. In
essence, the Court determined that
the collective bargaining process
would grind to a halt if groups are
prohibited from making competition-restricting agreements among
themselves that are often necessary
to further a collective labor-management goal.
Although the Association
conceded that an exemption exists, it
claimed that the exemption did not
apply in the present context.
Consequently, the Court analyzed
the scope of the exemption. Specifically, the Court determined whether
the exemption, applies to multiemployer bargaining and whether
Congress intended the exemption to
be effective with respect to the
NFL's tactic of implementing a
multi-employer wage plan after a
bargaining impasse.
Writing for the majority, Justice
Breyer explained that, as of 1994,
multi-employer bargaining accounts
for more than 40% of all major
collective bargaining agreements.
He further stated that multi-employer bargaining is a prevalent
method of collective bargaining
used in many industries, including

professional sports, and offers
several advantages to both labor and
management. Citing NLRB cases
and treatises on the subject, the
Court concluded that the practice of
multiemployer bargaining plays an
important part in the nation's
industrial relations system.
Justice Breyer additionally noted
that the courts and the NLRB have
held that the federal labor laws
permit the implementation of
changes to preexisting conditions
under an earlier contract after a
bargaining impasse. In order to
implement changes after a bargaining impasse, the Court noted that
two requirements must be satisfied.
First, the new terms must be
"reasonably comprehended" within
previous employer proposals prior to
the impasse to assure that less
favorable terms will not be imposed
through the unilateral implementation of changes. Second, the new
terms must not involve unfair labor
practices. For example, employers
must bargain in good faith.
By adhering to these requirements, the Court concluded that a
unilateral implementation of a postimpasse multi-employer proposal
constitutes an "integral part of the
bargaining process" which gives
effect to our nation's labor policy of
promoting peace through strengthened collective bargaining.

Collective bargaining
disputes should be kept
out of antitrustcourts
Lastly, the Court refused to
subject multi-employer post-impasse
implementation to the antitrust laws.
In particular, the Court expressed
concern that antitrust courts would
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have to answer numerous questions
regarding the procedure of collective
bargaining for wages, hours, and
working conditions. By not limiting
the scope of the antitrust laws, the
Court concluded that the inherent
benefits of collective bargaining
would be in jeopardy. Moreover, the
Court noted that nonexpert judges or
juries may premise antitrust liability
on a premeditated agreement of
uniform behavior on the part of the
employers or on the lack of an
independent decision of a competing
employer.

Justice Stevens's dissent
an exemption from the
exemption
In his dissent, Justice Stevens
pointed out that an accommodation
must exist for the Congressional
policy favoring collective bargaining
and the Congressional policy
favoring free competition in

business markets. Although Justice
Stevens conceded that a nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust
laws is necessary in certain circumstances, he indicated that the unique
nature of the professional sports
industry warrants a nonapplication
of the exemption from the antitrust
laws.
Justice Stevens noted that all
salaries in the professional sports
industry are individually negotiated-a practice which does not
exist in any other industry. He
emphasized that this practice existed
both before and after a 1982
collective bargaining agreement
which granted players an express
right to negotiate their respective
salaries individually with club
owners. However, because this
"developmental squad" introduces a
new expansion of the traditional
salaried players, he maintained that
the current imposition of fixed
wages on a player's benefits

package was not foreseeable during
the original 1982 collective bargaining agreement. Thus, Justice Stevens
found the "developmental squad" to
warrant special attention. In agreeing with the district court, he
concluded that the "developmental
squad" is a novel idea which was not
entertained by the 1982 agreement
between the players and the NFL.
Therefore, Justice Stevens determined that the antitrust exemption,
normally intrinsic to a collective
bargaining agreement, should not
apply because the Association did
not negotiate the players' rights in
the original 1982 agreement. Thus,
Justice Stevens concluded that the
antitrust exemption, coupled with
the lack of a mutually agreed upon
collective bargaining agreement,
would infringe upon the
Association's freedom to contract
and would contradict the very
purpose of the exemption-the
ability to negotiate freely.

Independent service organizations survive Kodak's
motion for summary judgment on Sherman Act claims
by PatrickMcGovern
In Eastman Kodak v. Image TechnicalService, Inc.,
504 U.S. 451 (1992), the Supreme Court affirmed a
lower court's ruling that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether Kodak possessed market power in
the relevant market for service and parts for its machines
even though Kodak lacked market power in the relevant
market for the sale of its copying equipment. The Court
held as a matter of law that a single brand of product or
service can be a relevant market under the Sherman Act.
Further, the Court clarified its earlier standard for
summary judgment enunciated in MatsushitaElectrical
IndustrialCo. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986), by stating that a plaintiff in an antitrust case does
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not carry a special burden to defeat a motion for
summary judgment. The Court referred to its decision in
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986),
which held that a nonmoving party can survive a motion
for summary judgment if the court finds that the party's
inferences are reasonable.

Kodak's policy to maintain own products
Kodak manufactured and sold copiers and micrographic equipment and replacement parts for its equipment and offered service for Kodak equipment. Kodak
provided 80% to 95% of the service for Kodak ma-
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